




Playing In The App Sandbox



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About Me

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Presentation Goals

- Examine App Sandboxing's "Raison d'Etire"
- Peek at the Technology Behind Sandboxing
- Explore Entitlements and XPC
- Demo
- Dirty Little Secrets!





What Is App Sandboxing?

- An “Electric Fence”
- Has roots in iOS
- Keeps the app honest
- A preemptive strike by Apple to head off malware and strengthens platform





Keeps “Bad Actors” Out





Why Sandboxing?

After all, isn't the Mac already secure??

- It's good security practice
- Mac App Store requires it
- It's the Future...



Traditional UNIX Security

- Users and Groups
- File Permissions
- Access Control Lists

```
Terminal -- top -- 97x31
bash
top
Processes: 53 total, 2 running, 2 stuck, 49 sleeping... 388 threads
Load Avg: 8.12, 8.15, 8.17 - CPU usage: 8.90% user, 8.90% sys, 83.19% idle
SharedLibs: num = 1, resident = 432 code, 492K data, 492K linked.
MemRegions: num = 7795, resident = 4778 + 1828 private, 2620 shared.
PhysMem: 1940 wired, 3429 active, 2780 inactive, 18860 used, 120 free.
VM: 120 + 140 89778(1) pageins, 28148(1) pageouts

PID CPU TIME #TR #RES #PRVT #SHRD #LDR #LCK
999 screencapt 8.8% 0:00.02 1 39 77 384K+ 2720K+ 190K 3630
830 bash 8.8% 0:00.00 1 14 19 256K 62K 880 740
835 login 8.8% 0:00.00 1 16 55 24K 26K 71K 750
817 top 3.6% 0:21.54 1 21 29 2832K 188K 2520K 740
814 iChatAgent 8.8% 0:00.21 2 73 73 195K 236K 514K 3440
778 bash 8.8% 0:00.01 1 14 19 24K 62K 880 740
777 login 8.8% 0:00.01 1 16 55 24K 26K 71K 750
775 edbarker 8.8% 0:00.13 4 53 38 64K 222K 194K 870
762 Terminal 8.3% 0:13.04 7 389 385 424K 110 170 4100
749 Safari 8.8% 0:12.62 22 282 768 688 310 910 5850
744 iTunes 8.1% 0:26.49 15 311 585 458 250 750 5190
733 Front Row 8.1% 0:36.58 14 288 324 1438 180 1540 6270
732 edbarker 8.8% 0:00.45 5 76 182 188K 312K 419K 1800
300 Preview 8.8% 0:36.54 14 143 258 858K 694K 220 4480
248 launchd 8.8% 0:00.01 3 24 25 2K 22K 18K 740
211 word 8.8% 0:00.01 1 19 21 4K 18K 24K 740
200 AppleFileS 8.8% 0:04.56 2 61 58 318K 162K 128K 820
199 check_saf 8.8% 0:00.23 2 25 28 8K 13K 27K 740
154 Finder 8.8% 2:29.29 21 752 919 1617 458 1820 13240
158 iCalShareS 8.8% 0:00.14 1 58 83 18K 228K 96K 3520
149 iTuneSHelp 8.8% 0:00.09 1 49 42 12K 212K 66K 3460
142 RTSServer 8.8% 0:01.39 2 99 81 124K 418K 336K 1160
140 SystemUIE 8.8% 0:02.21 8 231 215 1272K 4952K 336K 4800
```





Sandboxed Apps


Activity Monitor

Quit Process Inspect Sample Process

PID	Process Name	Sandbox	User	% CPU	Th
219	tccd	Yes	boisy	0.0	
12630	Preview	Yes	boisy	0.0	
18127	Mail	Yes	boisy	17.9	
18403	Quick Look Helper	Yes	boisy	0.0	
5154	Safari Web Content	Yes	boisy	0.5	
16596	QTKitServer-(5154) Safari Web Co...	Yes	boisy	0.0	
1425	pboard	Yes	boisy	0.0	
228	xpcd	Yes	boisy	0.0	
18405	QuickLookSatellite-general	Yes	boisy	0.0	
18262	TextEdit	Yes	boisy	0.0	
1463	Dropbox	No	boisy	0.5	



How Sandboxing Works






Who Can't Play in the Sandbox

- Kernel extensions
- Apps that set preferences of other apps
- Apps that send Apple events to other apps



Sandbox? or Quicksand?






Delays In Enforcement

- Was coming November 2011
- Then Postponed to March 2012
- Again Postponed to June 2012
- Now: Mandatory for the Mac App Store
- NOT Required for non-MAS Apps (yet?)





Technology





Sandboxing's Vintage

Arrived in Mac OS X 10.5

Required for Mac App Store
for Mac OS X 10.6

Baked into the OS and is
here to stay!





Under The Covers

- **sandbox-exec**
 - launches apps in a sandboxed environment
 - uses a profile to determine restrictions
 - `/usr/share/sandbox`
- **sandboxd**
 - daemon that performs sandbox services



Containers



- Sandboxed apps get their own private file system
 - `~/Library/Containers/<app_bundle_id>/Data/`
- Access is unhampered in that folder



Container View



Desktop



Documents



Downloads



Library



Movies



Music




Pictures



Powerbox (pboxd)

- Allows access to files outside of the container
- Supports NSOpenPanel, NSSavePanel, dragging to Dock icon
- User-directed, automatically makes selected files accessible for the duration of the application's run





Entitlements





Entitlements Are...

- “Grants” from Apple which allow your app to do certain things
- Specifically named (com.apple.security...)
- Enumerated in YourApp.entitlements plist file, used when signing your app



Enforcement

- Enforced at the system level
- Violations are flagged and prevented from executing
- Violations also show up in Console.app





Entitlements

Read-only access to the user's Movies folder and iTunes movies	<code>com.apple.security.assets.movies.read-only</code>
Read/write access to the user's Movies folder and iTunes movies	<code>com.apple.security.assets.movies.read-write</code>
Read-only access to the user's Music folder	<code>com.apple.security.assets.music.read-write</code>
Read/write access to the user's Music folder	<code>com.apple.security.assets.pictures.read-only</code>
Read-only access to the user's Pictures folder	<code>com.apple.security.assets.pictures.read-only</code>
Read/write access to the user's Pictures folder	<code>com.apple.security.assets.pictures.read-write</code>
Interaction with Bluetooth devices	<code>com.apple.security.device.bluetooth</code>
Capture of movies and still images using the built-in camera, if available	<code>com.apple.security.device.camera</code>



Entitlements

Recording of audio using the built-in microphone, if available, along with access to audio input using any Core Audio API that supports audio input	<code>com.apple.security.device.microphone</code>
Interaction with serial devices	<code>com.apple.security.device.serial</code>
Interaction with USB devices, including HID devices such as joysticks	<code>com.apple.security.device.usb</code>
Read/write access to the user's Downloads folder	<code>com.apple.security.files.downloads.read-write</code>
Use of app-scoped bookmarks and URLs	<code>com.apple.security.files.bookmarks.app-scope</code>
Use of document-scoped bookmarks and URLs	<code>com.apple.security.files.bookmarks.collection-scope</code>
Read-only access to files the user has selected using an Open or Save dialog	<code>com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-only</code>
Read-only access to files the user has selected using an Open or Save dialog	<code>com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-only</code>
Read/write access to files the user has selected using an Open or Save dialog	<code>com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-write</code>
Child process inheritance of the parent's sandbox	<code>com.apple.security.inherit</code>



Entitlements

Outgoing network socket for connecting to other machines	<code>com.apple.security.network.client</code>
Incoming network socket for listening for requests from other machines	<code>com.apple.security.network.server</code>
Read/write access to contacts in the user's address book; allows apps to infer the default address book if more than one is present on a system	<code>com.apple.security.personal-information.addressbook</code>
Use of the Core Location framework for determining the computer's geographical location	<code>com.apple.security.personal-information.location</code>
Printing	<code>com.apple.security.print</code>



Exception Entitlements

- Temporary grants by Apple for issues that haven't been permanently dealt with
- May be altered or completely disappear in subsequent revisions of the OS
- Ex: Sending Apple Events, Home and Absolute path relative access



XPC





Least Privilege Separation

- Functionality is split into smaller executable components on a process level
- Each component has its own entitlements
- Use of Interprocess Communication to establish connection between main app and XPC components



The Benefits

- Functionality is partitioned
- Attackers can only affect a subset of your application
- Code reuse between apps



Demos





Migrating Existing Apps





Migration Manifest

- A plist file embedded in your app
- Facilitates moving files from old locations to new sandboxed folder



SANDBOXING'S





Unexpected Errors

- Sandbox violations can cause errors in places that you have not expected them
- Check for (and handle) error values on methods that you call
- Not doing so can cause unexpected app failures



AppleScript

- Receive & Respond to Apple events
- Can send Apple events to a specific app using temporary entitlement





The Story of Shmat

```
void *shmat(int shmid, const void *shmaddr, int shmflg);
```





The Bottom Line

- 3rd party frameworks, libraries or plug-ins are susceptible points of failure
- Test your app thoroughly to find and eliminate sandbox violations



The Future

NEXT EXIT





Yesterday

The Good Ole Days!



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

3-5 Day Wait



Today



Download in Seconds
or Minutes





Tomorrow

- All Apps on the Mac will be Sandboxed
- All Apps will be on the Mac App Store
- Entitlements will be expanded





Summary

- App Sandboxing protects your apps
- Entitlements guide your app's behavior
- XPC mitigates security issues by partitioning behavior into small processes
- Testing is critical to surface issues raised by sandbox violations



More Information

- Apple's Developer Forums
- App Sandbox Design Guide
- Daemons and Services Programming Guide

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